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1 Introduction
The UK has seen a concerted assault on secular
spaces in the wake of civil unrest in some of the
Northern cities in 2001, the 9/11 atrocity and the
7/7 London bombings of 2005. In the guise of the
‘war on terror’, the state’s response to the threat
of Islamist terrorism has been dominated by a
two-pronged approach to minorities – first, to
counter the direct threat of terrorism with
draconian, anti-civil liberties measures; and,
second, the development of a new ‘cohesion’ and
faith-based approach to minorities to replace the
previously dominant ideological framework of
multiculturalism for mediation between State
and minority populations.
The process of de-secularisation started in the
late 1980s following the Rushdie affair, when
cracks appeared in the widely held view that
Britain was a secular society in all but name. The
Rushdie affair and the resurgence of religious
fundamentalism in all religions1 not only exposed
the lack of separation between the Church of
England and the State and the privileging of
Christianity above other religions, but also the
limits of multiculturalism which placed primacy
on the preservation of religious identities of the
various minorities above the need to build a
democratic, secular and anti-racist culture.2 For
Muslims, the Rushdie Affair marked a significant
turning point when demands for recognition and
equality became focused upon religious
observance and identity. Other minorities
quickly followed suit.
The ‘war on terror’ has resulted in the deliberate
pursuit of domestic policies by the British state
aimed at accommodating religious identity within
public institutions. This is in turn, a reflection of
a number of political and social trends resulting
in the shrinking of secular spaces and the
increasing communalisation (involving religious
and community groups mobilising solely around
religious identities) of South Asian populations in
particular – a process which has been quietly
taking place for some time.
In accommodating religion within state
institutions, the state’s aim ostensibly has been
to contain Islamist terrorism on British soil and
to construct a moderate British Islam but the
process of de-secularisation is having far-
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reaching consequences in re-ordering and
undermining the democratic nature of civil
society with very specific consequences for all
progressive struggles but especially those waged
by minority women. This process is occurring
hand in hand with the dismantling of the welfare
state and the pursuit of a racist anti-immigration
agenda. The new cohesion and faith-based
approach to minorities has therefore become a
political resource used by the state and the
religious right in all communities to aid the
de-secularisation process.
This article explores the erosion of secular public
culture in the UK and its implications for
minority women whose bodies have become the
battleground for the control of community
representation. My argument is that struggles
for equality and secularism now overlap and have
taken on a sense of urgency because it is the
human rights of women that are being traded in
the various social contracts that are emerging
between state and the religious right minority
leaderships in the UK.
2 The SBS experience
I use as my starting point a campaign waged by
the Southall Black Sisters (SBS) in 2007/8
against a decision made by the local authority
(Ealing Council) to cease critical funding used by
SBS to provide life-saving front-line services for
minority women subject to violence and abuse in
the family. What began as a local funding dispute
soon came to signify a much larger struggle for
equality and for the right to exist as an
autonomous, secular, anti-racist and feminist
organisation.
SBS was first set up in 1979, comprising African-
Caribbean and Asian women, in the midst of
intense anti-racist activity. We consciously
adopted a secular feminist identity, one based on
a shared history of colonialism, racism and
religious patriarchal control. The absence of
recognition of gender power relations within the
previous anti-racist movements and the absence
of acknowledgement of racism within white
feminist movements had resulted in the
invisibility of black and minority women. It was
this invisibility which gave rise to the
organisation and others alike. Personally, SBS
was exactly the kind of political home that I and
other women like me were searching for, since it
enabled us to explore and validate our
experiences of racism without suppressing the
problem of gender inequality within family and
community. None of this was easy to do in
contexts where the only legitimate struggle by
many on the progressive left was perceived to be
the struggle for racial equality.
Since 1982, SBS has operated as a not-for-profit,
advice, advocacy and campaigning centre for
black women, with a particular focus on the
needs of South Asian women subject to gender-
based violence. While based in West London, an
area with a large South Asian population, we
have a national reach.3
In 2007, Ealing Council decided to cut funding to
SBS on the grounds that specialist services for
black and minority women worked against the
interest of ‘equality’, ‘diversity’ and ‘cohesion’.
Our very name and existence was deemed to be
unlawful under the Race Relations Act 1976
because it excluded white women and was
therefore discriminatory and divisive. Instead, in
the name of ‘best value’ for money, the Council
decided to commission a borough-wide generic
domestic violence service using the funds that
had previously been awarded to SBS – funds
critical to SBS in meeting core costs which were
not easily available from other grant-making
bodies, because most prefer to fund specific
projects rather than overall running costs.
We were concerned that, if left unchallenged,
Ealing Council’s approach would have allowed
public bodies to redefine the notion of equality in
ways that undermined the very concept. It had
come to be defined by Ealing Council as the need
to provide the same services for everyone, in an
attempt to address some resentment among the
white population that it was the majority white
population rather than the minorities that had
historically been discriminated against and
‘excluded’ from civic regeneration policies. The
notion of equality in this sense was no longer
linked to the needs of the most vulnerable and
deprived, but instead viewed as reflecting the
needs of the majority community. Our fear was
that this approach would be replicated with
confidence elsewhere in the country, leading to
the widespread closure of similar organisations set
up to counter racism and provide minority women
with real alternatives to patriarchal community
(religious and cultural based) mechanisms for
dealing with disputes in the family.
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SBS therefore brought a legal challenge against
Ealing Council, which culminated on 18 July
2008 when, at the High Court in London, SBS
won an important affirmation of the right to
exist as a secular specialist provider of domestic
violence services to black and minority women.
In court, SBS submitted that Ealing Council’s
approach to equality in effect meant that the
race equality legislation in the UK could not
protect those who are historically
disenfranchised and discriminated against, since
it rejected the notion of positive action in
addressing racism. We argued that the Council’s
‘one size fits all’ approach was misconstrued
because it ignored unequal structural relations
based on class, gender and race. The SBS further
argued that specialist services for minority
women are needed, not only for reasons to do
with language difficulties and cultural and
religious pressures, but also because of the need
for advice and advocacy framed within a
democratic and secular ethos in complex
circumstances where racism and religious
fundamentalism are on the rise in the UK and
worldwide.
SBS also argued that Ealing Council’s approach
to cohesion was fundamentally wrong because it
failed to recognise that, far from causing
divisions, the provision of specialist services may
sometimes be necessary to address substantive
inequality, and that in turn is central to
achieving a more cohesive society. It was pointed
out that the SBS project was in fact an example
of how cohesion is achieved organically, borne out
of collective struggles for human rights, and not
by the imposition of ill-conceived social policies
from above. It was described how black and
minority women from various national, ethnic
and religious backgrounds learn to co-exist in
the secular space provided by the SBS. In doing
so, they both tolerate religious and cultural
differences and at the same time challenge
religious and cultural practices that stifle their
common desires and aspirations to live free from
violence, abuse and from other constrictions on
their lives.
The newly formed Equalities and Human Rights
Commission (EHRC) which intervened at SBS’s
insistence also criticised Ealing Council’s
interpretation and implementation of the
equality legislation and its policy on cohesion.
Finding in SBS’s favour, Lord Justice Moses who
presided over the hearing held that Ealing
Council had deliberately failed to have proper
regard to its duties under the Race Relations Act
1976, and had taken a flawed approach to
cohesion in reaching its decision:
There is no dichotomy between the promotion
of equality and cohesion and the provision of
specialist services to an ethnic minority.
Barriers cannot be broken down unless the
victims themselves recognise that the source
of help is coming from the same community
and background as they do. Ealing’s mistake
was to believe that cohesion and equality
precluded the provision of services from such
a source. It seemed to believe that such
services could only lawfully be provided by a
single provider or consortium to victims of
domestic violence throughout the borough. It
appreciates that it was in error and that in
certain circumstances the purposes of Section
71 and the relevant statutory code may only
be met by specialist services from a specialist
source. That is the importance of the name of
the Southall Black Sisters. Its very name
evokes home and family.4
Lord Justice Moses concluded his much
celebrated judgement by safeguarding a more
progressive notion of equality:
An equal society protects and promotes
equality, real freedom and substantive
opportunity to live in the ways people value
and would choose so that everyone can
flourish. An equal society recognises people’s
different needs, situations and goals and
removes the barriers that limit what people
can do and can be.
The SBS case has created a legal precedent as to
the correct approach to be taken by statutory
public bodies in the delivery of services and the
funding of specialist organisations. The challenge
has come to represent a key moment for black
and minority groups and other organisations in
the voluntary or third sector seeking to address
the needs of the vulnerable and marginalised in
society. But it has also sounded a warning bell to
secular progressive minority groups.
Ealing Council’s cynical use of the cohesion
agenda to cut our funding has profound
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implications for the human rights of black and
minority women in particular. We are acutely
aware that the judgement, notwithstanding its
progressive definition of equality, does not
necessarily preclude fundamentalists and the
religious right from claiming scarce public
funding to provide faith-based services on the
grounds that they are best placed to address
those from the same religious background.
3 Cohesion: a new policy framework for minorities
As the SBS example so clearly shows, the
cohesion approach promoted by the government,
is now the dominant framework for dealing with
minorities. It is a policy objective that is linked to
the other overarching themes of governance in
the UK today, greater civic engagement;
preventing violent Muslim extremism; ‘managing
migration’ with a view to assimilation and the
shift in institutional accountability towards faith-
based organisations and institutions.
Cohesion is a malleable term that has never been
precisely defined by the government. Official
definitions refer to cohesion as a ‘process that
must happen in all communities to ensure that
different groups of people get on well together’
(Commission on Integration and Cohesion
2007). At the national and local level, a ‘cohesive’
community is described as one in which there is a
common ‘vision and sense of belonging for all
communities; where the diversity of people’s
different backgrounds and circumstances is
appreciated and positively valued; where those
from different backgrounds have similar life
opportunities and where there are strong and
positive relationships developing between people
from different backgrounds and circumstances in
the workplace, in schools and within
neighbourhoods.5
While the rhetoric of cohesion appears to have
laudable aims and locates the responsibility for
community cohesion on all communities
including the majority community, in reality, the
government has linked the issue with race. Its
guidance document for instance calls on local
councils to develop their cohesion strategy in the
context of race relations. The assumption is that
it is migrants (largely Muslims) who have failed
to integrate into a ‘British way of life’ or adopt
‘British values’ and are therefore responsible for
the lack of cohesion in society. The SBS funding
crisis illustrated this connection clearly.
The government’s cohesion strategy can be
traced back to July 2001 and the civil
disturbances that took place in the northern UK
cities of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford – areas
with large Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim
populations. These northern towns and cities are
economically deprived areas historically born out
of the collapse of the textile industries and the
failure of social policies to redistribute resources
equitably. The entire region is characterised by
considerable social segregation, especially in
education, social exclusion, poor housing and
racism. The result has been simmering
community tensions between white British and
Asian British youths in particular, who have
fought each other and the police in street
battles, often fuelled by inflammatory right wing
organisations and the media.
In implementing the ‘cohesion’ policy, the state
followed a contradictory course. For example, far
from removing racially segregated education,
identified as a major divisive force in British
society, the government actively promoted single-
faith schools and academies and set about
creating the conditions for faith-based
organisations to flourish.
In August 2006, the government announced the
launch of the Commission on Integration and
Cohesion to identify the ways in which local
areas can foster cohesion. The Chair of the
Commission was Darra Singh who was also
directly responsible for the SBS funding crisis as
the Chief Executive of Ealing Council. The
report of the Commission ‘Our Shared Future’,
published in June 2007, did not address
structural inequality or more pertinently the
contradictions of promoting faith-based
organisations in achieving cohesion. While there
was some acknowledgement in the report that
the disturbances in the northern cities in 2001
were in part a reflection of deprivation and
industrial decline, nevertheless its focus was
entirely on the need to develop local-based
cohesion work – largely through religious
exchange networks – and it gave guidance to
local authorities to avoid funding single identity
groups in particular. The report also avoided
addressing the problematic issue of state support
for faith-based schools, especially the existence
of Church of England, Catholic and Jewish
schools which in turn, has fuelled resentment
among other religious minorities, resulting in
IDS Bulletin Volume 42  Number 1  January 2011 29
the growth of state funding of Muslim, Sikh and
Hindu schools.
In 2008, the government issued a consultation
document ‘Guidance for Funders’ (Department
for Communities and Local Government 2008),
which formed an important part of the
government’s response to the Commission on
Integration and Cohesion and its report ‘Our
Shared Future’. The Guidance set out the
government’s intention to advise funders on
‘practical ways in which local authorities could
help build strong communities by promoting
cohesion and integration locally.’ Following the
report, the Guidance also placed conditions on
the funding of single community groups defined
as third sector groups providing targeted support
for single issue/identity-based community activity.
These groups include black and minority groups
and other equality groups, including women’s
groups, gay and lesbian support groups, age and
disability groups and service providers. The view
was that local funding should not be made
available to single group projects if it ‘builds
resentment in others’. Following the SBS funding
victory, the government withdrew the Guidance
on funding for single identity groups and left it to
local authorities to use their discretion on what
organisations to fund or services to commission.
Local Authorities have since continued to divest
themselves and their areas of their ‘race’
equality departments and officers and replaced
them with Community Cohesion Directorates. It
would appear that it is the long-standing single
identity groups (more often than not, progressive
and secular) that are targeted for funding cuts at
the same time as encouraging faith-based groups
to emerge, as discussed below. The withdrawal of
funding for SBS is one high profile example but
there have been others, including several Asian
women’s refuges, mental health and community
organisations for African and Caribbean people,
to name but a few.
This dual process was vividly evident at the
height of SBS’s funding crisis. The irony of the
situation in which SBS found itself was, that at
the same time that Ealing Council decided to
withdraw financial assistance, Ealing’s Cohesion
Strategy was and continues to be dominated by
the need to promote faith-based (largely
Muslim) groups to deliver local welfare services
(Ealing Council 2007).6
Ealing Council’s Preventing Violent Extremism
(PVE) (Ealing Council 2008) strategies also
reflect a major preoccupation with engagement
with Muslims only. Of the £45 million made
available by the government for 2008–11 to local
authorities to tackle extremism among Muslims,
Ealing Council received a total £205,000 for
2008–9, rising to £225,000 and £286,000 for
2009–10, respectively. Ealing’s PVE agenda seeks
to ‘gather greater understanding of the
issues/concerns facing Muslim communities;
provide space for greater dialogue and discussion
around Muslim identity and understanding
Islamic values; provide more opportunities for
engagement with the wider community through
volunteering and establish greater support
networks for Muslim women. Under the theme of
‘Engaging with Muslim Women’, the Council has
made a grant of £35,000 available to local groups
to ‘foster in young Muslim women a greater
willingness to express their own views and
influence their local community, a greater
awareness on how to access public services offered
by statutory bodies such as the Council, and a
greater awareness on how to become involved in
local decision-making processes. Youth services
have also been provided with £10,000 to engage
with Muslim girls in secondary schools through
lunchtime sessions to discuss the concerns of the
Muslim girls (Ealing Council 2008).
While Ealing Council maintains that the PVE
focus ‘compliments the emerging borough
“Integration and Community Cohesion” strategy
developed in 2007’, in practice, the Council’s
PVE and Cohesion strategies are
indistinguishable.
One consequence of Ealing Council’s cohesion
approach is that it has encouraged the
development of faith-based initiatives, including
the future creation of Muslim women-only
projects, without any reference to the politics
and ethos of such projects and even though there
are no visible demands for such organisations
(Ealing Council 2008). This approach is being
repeated throughout the UK and the
organisations that have so far been closed or
threatened with closure are secular organisations
for black and ethnic migrants, secular women’s
refuges for black and minority women, disability
groups and rape crisis centres. Following SBS’s
lead, organisations confronting similar funding
problems with their local authorities have
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mounted legal challenges against their Councils
using the equality legislation but while some
have been successful, others have not.
Paradoxically, the emphasis on funding faith-
based groups have led some previously secular
black and minority organisations to re-fashion
themselves as faith-based groups – this has the
effect of reinforcing the view that questions of
identity within minority communities can be
reduced to questions of religious values only.
Discussions with a number of anti-racist activists
in the north of England have suggested that
minority groups have recently adopted a faith-
based identity in order to attract local authority
funding that has been diverted from anti-racist
projects to cohesion and preventing violent
extremism work.
4 From multiculturalism to multi-faithism
The rise of fundamentalist leaderships in
minority communities has posed a significant
threat to the autonomy and fundamental
freedoms of minority women in the UK. Since
2000, however, minority women have found
themselves facing a more difficult and invidious
battle involving not just fundamentalists but
mainstream religious leadership itself – the so-
called ‘moderates’ – who, with the demise of
progressive secular institutions within minority
communities, in particular black workers’
support organisations, anti-racist and police
monitoring groups and Asian women’s refuges,
are increasingly seen by the state to be fulfilling
a crucial role in mediating between state and
community. This is of course a process that has
always occurred under multiculturalism, but
what is different, is the unequivocal
acknowledgement by the state that religion is a
vital part of public life which cannot be ignored.
The faith-based perspective (a framework of
mediation between state and community
institutions based solely around religious
identity), is now an integral part of the cohesion
agenda. At its heart is the view that civil society
is split into two groups – those that are faith
based and those that are secular. There is
increasing conviction in official policy that the
experiences, resources and networks of people
based on religious identity have been neglected
in favour of secular groups (Ealing Council
2008). To correct this situation, strategies and
programmes are developed to give faith-based
organisations full opportunity to participate in
society because they are deemed to be important
sources of social capital (vital sources of civic
mobilisation and social campaigning) (Ealing
Council 2008). These policies and strategies
effectively re-cast ethnic minority communities
(especially South Asian) as ‘faith communities’
so, for example Asian communities are
increasingly re-categorised as ‘Hindu’, ‘Sikh’ and
‘Muslim’ communities.
The increasing emphasis on religion and religious
identities has led to the transformation of Britain
from a multicultural into ‘multi-faith’ society,
based on a model of ‘integration’ which views the
discrimination and exclusion of many in black
and minority communities not as a product of
class inequality or racism, but as a historical
failure to respect and facilitate religious identity
within public institutions. Models of civic
engagement based on notions of citizenship and
respect for individual human rights, which have
never been given the opportunity to take root
properly, are replaced by notions of social
cohesion and integration involving adherence to
‘core British values’. But such adherence does not
displace cultural or religious identity. In fact, the
emphasis on engagement based on faith identity
encourages adherence to cultural and social
autonomy as well as to a core set of values which
are mostly about the maintenance of public order.
This is well understood by both the state and the
various religious leaderships. For example, the
UK’s Islamic Human Rights Commission has
made it clear that it sees no reason why minority
communities cannot be guided by their personal
religious laws, since this does not impact on social
cohesion. The demand for equality is therefore
substituted by the demand for greater
recognition of religious diversity and the need for
‘religious literacy’. That is, the need to
understand the dominant theological values and
traditions as espoused by religious leaders, but
not the recognition of the various liberal cultural
and religious and non-religious traditions within
a community.
Faith groups are now to be found at the heart of
the regeneration of communities and as a direct
result, religion is becoming increasingly
entrenched within state institutions at central
and local levels, and is reflected at all levels of
state policy. In all the key public institutions, the
emphasis has shifted to the need to provide
services that are ‘sensitive to religious identities
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and values’. This has brought into the domain of
religious groups, concerns which were once
addressed by progressive secular anti-racist and
feminist groups, including issues such as
domestic violence, child protection, and the
rights of black and minority offenders in the
criminal justice system.
The state’s multi-faith approach has opened up
the space for a reactionary politics of identity
based on religion to flourish and has put power
and authority into the hands of religious leaders.
The conflation of issues around race with
religious identity as defined by the state and
fundamentalist and conservative religious
leaderships, has also paradoxically, led to the
direct sponsorship of fundamentalist or
reactionary organisations such as the Muslim
Council of Great Britain, The Muslim
Association and the Hindu Forum of Britain,7 all
of whom claim to be ‘moderates’ and all of whom
have enjoyed or enjoy an unprecedented
influence on state policy towards minorities.
The so-called ‘moderates’8 may profess to keep
law and order on the streets of Britain and decry
the extremists in their midst but many are
linked to violent fundamentalist movements
abroad where violence is routinely used to
subjugate women. Nor are they moderate on the
question of women’s rights in the UK. Many have
used the space opened up by the government’s
faith and cohesion agenda to put themselves
forward as the ‘authentic’ voice of their
communities and make demands which are
primarily about limiting women’s participation
in the public sphere and maintaining the private
sphere of the family as the only legitimate arena
of female existence.
The state’s cohesion and faith-based approach
fits neatly into a wider neoconservative agenda
involving the privatisation of vital state
functions. The steady demise of the welfare state
cannot be underestimated, since the breach that
is created has allowed religion to step in,
advantaged as it is over secular groups, by its
networks of membership and vast resources.
Space does not allow a full discussion of the role
of religion in the provision of social services in
the UK, but the shifting of institutional
accountability for welfare services on to religious
organisations is a dangerous development. It has
to be recognised that religious groups can and do
play an important role in helping to combat
poverty, homelessness and destitution faced by
immigrants and asylum seekers for instance, but
they do this while remaining in the private
sector, raising funds through their own
membership and from other sources. Most
importantly, their users are relatively free to
exercise choice in whether or not they wish to
use their services. But what is harmful about the
cohesion and faith-based approach is the fact
that in the name of equality, religious groups are
being brought into the public domain through
public funding to provide services on the basis of
their religious ethos and belief systems. The
danger is that through need and individual
circumstances coupled with a lack of
alternatives, users, such as vulnerable minority
women will have no choice but to use the services
offered by religious organisations. Needless to
say, and as the experience of women and sexual
minorities shows, those who do not share the
ethos and values of such organisations will find
themselves discriminated against and excluded.9
5 Minority women and the struggle for human
rights
The struggle for equality and for the human
rights of all minority women in the UK is now
inextricably linked to the struggle for secular
spaces. The turning point in compelling feminist
organisations like SBS to make explicit this
connection was the Rushdie Affair and the
growing power of religious fundamentalists who
used the multicultural terrain to pursue a
vigorous de-secularisation agenda (Southall
Black Sisters 1990; Sahgal and Davies 1992). The
anti-Rushdie protests created the conditions for
the emergence of a culture of intolerance, fear
and censorship, which remains with us in a more
heightened form. Since the 1990s, we have
witnessed with alarming frequency, religious
fundamentalist and authoritarian10 protests to
any form of dissent from an imposed religious
identity, much of which has centred directly and
indirectly on the control of women’s sexuality.
Nor are such protests confined to Muslims only.
Hindus, Sikhs and Christians in the majority
community have also sought to impose strict
religious identity on followers by clamping down
on dissent.11 It would seem that orthodox if not
fundamentalist12 leaders in all religions are vying
for control over the representation of their
communities. In the process, what is made
transparent is the re-invention of essentialist
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notions of religion as a framework for
highlighting inequalities and demanding
recognition.13
6 The privatisation of family law
The feminist and human rights scholar Karima
Bennoune (2007) has stated that the struggle to
keep human rights and the law separate is one of
the most urgent struggles now taking place
globally. She adds that the emphasis on ‘freedom
of religion’ has overshadowed the importance of
‘freedom from religion’ (Bennoune 2007). This is
clearly evident in recent debates and
developments in respect of demands made by
some Muslim organisations to incorporate
aspects of personal laws (Sharia laws) in relation
to the family within the English legal system, a
move which is encouraged by leading figures in
the judiciary and the Church of England.14
6.1 Religious arbitration tribunals
Family laws are increasingly at the centre of
political controversies between religious groups
and secular feminists in the UK. The recent
creation of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal
(MAT) in the UK, set up and managed in
accordance with the Arbitration Act 1996 for
alternative dispute resolution in civil law cases,
especially family cases in England, is an example
of how religion is encroaching upon the secular
legal system (Taher 2008).15 The MAT will enable
arbitration (mediation by another name) of,
among others, family disputes to take place in
accordance with ‘Islamic sacred law’.16 By existing
within the framework of the Arbitration Act 1996,
the MAT will ensure that its determinations can
be enforced by the English courts in cases where
both parties have agreed to be bound by the
outcome.
Groups like SBS and Women Against
Fundamentalism17 have challenged developments
such as the MAT, by arguing that the demand for
religious personal laws will result in the
privatisation of family law and thus become the
main means by which the absolute control of
minority women is maintained. Such a
development will in effect allow unelected and
unaccountable community leaders to preside as
judges and make determinations based on
religious interpretations that have historically
discriminated against women and legitimised
their oppression within the family. Moreover,
when combined with the wider gender inequality
that persists in society more generally, women
will find it difficult to obtain a hearing on equal
terms.
It is true that if civil law principles are breached
by the operation of religious tribunals like the
MAT, it is open to a party to complain but that
choice is illusory unless a party is actually able to
complain and even then, the woman would need
to convince a court that legal principles are
breached. For example, to prove duress in cases
of forced marriage, she would have to meet the
evidentiary threshold required and this may not
be easy to do. Many women do not necessarily
know that their rights have been violated or will
not want to be seen to be dissenting from
religious norms and will not want to risk being
ostracised and subject to being declared a ‘bad
Muslim’ or ‘Sikh’ or ‘Hindu’. Many will not
complain even if there are violations of the law.
Moreover, social pressures which circumscribe
the choices open to women will not always be
acknowledged. Cases in the English courts
suggest that so far, only legal and not social
compulsion is recognised.18
The existing evidence on the outcome of family
disputes in the MAT, suggests that the primary
concern is to keep the family intact, even in
circumstances where women and children are
highly vulnerable to domestic or family violence.
For instance on its official website, the MAT
professes only to be concerned with civil disputes
and not to interfere with the criminal law
process but nevertheless it is interfering in ways
that undermine state protection for minority
women by limiting their participation in the civil
and criminal justice system, for example by
diverting them away from the formal legal
system towards informal, religious-based
mechanisms for dispute resolution. In a number
of domestic violence cases, the MAT has
succeeded in reconciling women with their
abusive partners without regard to their history
of abuse or their general vulnerability. Indeed,
the MAT has gone so far as to state that it will
actively interfere in criminal cases by seeking to
influence the Crown Prosecution Services to drop
charges in domestic violence cases even where
criminal offences may have been committed:
The MAT is unable to deal with criminal
offences as we do not have jurisdiction to try
such matters in the UK. However where there
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are criminal charges such as assault within
the context of domestic violence, the parties
will be able [to] ask MAT to assist in reaching
reconciliation which is observed and approved
by MAT as an independent organisation. The
terms of such a reconciliation can then be
passed by MAT on to the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS) through the local Police
Domestic Violence Liaison Officers with a
view to reconsidering the criminal charges.19
By allowing religious arbitration tribunals like
the MAT to adjudicate in family disputes, the
state is in effect privileging and sponsoring the
most dominant, patriarchal, homophobic and
authoritarian, if not fundamentalist
interpretations of religions in minority
communities. The incorporation of religious
personal laws within the legal system formalises
gender discrimination and a culturally relativist
approach to family cases; adding to the immense
community pressures that minority women
already face to agree to mediation and
governance, based on their religious identity. It
signals the view that it is legitimate for minority
communities to operate a second-rate justice
system based on unaccountable and partial
mechanisms of conflict resolution. This is in
itself a racist response to demands for equality
and justice, especially in view of the fact that
even in countries where state-sanctioned
religious laws operate, there are substantial
movements, often led by women and human
rights activists, for their repeal on the grounds
that they are not compatible with universal
human rights principles.
By accommodating religious systems of dispute
resolution in family matters in the English legal
system, the UK state is effectively taking away
the safety net of the secular legal system
underpinned as it is, by universal human rights
values to which minority women have
contributed through their struggles. In doing so,
it accepts the view propounded by religionists
that the principles of individual choice and
autonomy are ‘western’ or ‘alien’ concepts and
encourages the development of parallel legal
systems. The incorporation of the MAT within
the legal system directly contravenes the UK’s
obligations under the domestic and international
human rights law, which is to protect women and
children from acts of violence committed in
public or private spaces. The duty to exercise due
diligence, in order to prevent, investigate and
punish acts of violence against women, including
those carried out by non-state actors is a
necessary function of a democratic state and the
democratic principle. This duty is clearly being
subverted as the above quote on how the MATs
deals with domestic violence cases show. Instead
of encouraging women to seek redress or
accountability through the courts, the aim of the
MAT is solely to resolve family matters
informally, precisely in order to avoid the
scrutiny of the state.
In response to criticisms about the formalisation
of legally binding religious arbitration systems,
supporters of the MAT argue that it is an
important vehicle for the expression of Muslim
female ‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’ and that
regulation of the system is all that is required to
address gender discrimination.20 This
perspective, which at first glance appears
seductive, fails to grasp two crucial problems.
First, that the question of the exercise of choice
and autonomy for most minority women cannot
be divested from the social, political and
economic power dynamics that exist within and
without minority communities which usually
protect vested patriarchal interests. Second, the
need to save state resources is precisely why any
attempts to regulate religious tribunals will
ultimately fail, since the type of effective
regulation required would defeat the object of
the exercise, which is to save resources and time.
Global research conducted by the International
Council for Human Rights Policy in Geneva,
suggests that mechanisms for regulation in any
case are wholly absent, and that states that have
established separate religious laws are very
reluctant to intervene in their functioning to
regulate or reform them. The inevitable
consequence is that the laws of the minority will
remain unreformed for decades (International
Council on Human Rights Policy 2009).
6.2 Contradictory developments in the law’s response
to women’s human rights
Notwithstanding the demand for greater
‘religious literacy’ within the English legal
system, English judges from time to time have
safeguarded the rights of minority women,
despite accusations of ‘Islamaphobia’ or religious
insensitivity. Although not a uniform occurrence,
there have been some very welcome judgements
in the courts.
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In a recent case involving childcare proceedings,
Lord Justice Wall (2009) emphatically stated
that religious law cannot be allowed to trump
concerns about the physical safety of children. In
this case, a Muslim father of children under 11
years of age, sought to challenge the placement
of his children with a non-Muslim foster family
in circumstances where the children had suffered
horrific abuse. Dismissing evidence from a
Muslim scholar who appears to have argued that
placing the children with a non-Muslim family
would exacerbate the physical risk to the
children by making the matter more public,
thereby increasing the shame and dishonour
wrought on the family, the judge argued that the
correct priority was the physical safety of the
children.
The problem is that such insights about the
arbitrary application of religious laws and their
inherent bias in favour of patriarchal power do
not appear to be creatively applied in other
cases, nor do they influence social policy
considerations or the wider political culture
which is increasingly preoccupied with the desire
not to cause religious offence. In other words,
attempts to address the clash between key rights,
for example the right to manifest religion and
the right to gender equality in legal judgements,
are often ignored in state social policy and
practice towards minority communities.
The tendency to show deference to religious
values is usefully illustrated in a rape case that
came to SBS’s attention in 2006.21 The case
concerned a traditional Muslim woman who was
raped by her husband who was then prosecuted.
However, at trial she claimed that her religious
requirements meant that she could not take part
in a public legal process involving men unrelated
to her to whom she would have to answer
questions of a sexual nature.
In response, the prosecution counsel requested
the defendant to change to a female counsel, but
that request was refused, presumably on the
valid grounds that this interfered with the
defendant’s right to choose his own legal
representation. The prosecution counsel then
requested that the victim be allowed to give
evidence via a videolink through a female
interpreter so that she would not have to see or
hear the defendant’s barrister or indeed any
other male within the court room.
To accommodate this request, the judge
adjourned the hearings to obtain reports from a
Muslim cleric in order to ascertain the position
of Muslim women in public life. Following this
report, on religious and cultural grounds, he
permitted her to give her evidence and be cross-
examined via videolink through a female
interpreter.
It is easy to have a feminist kneejerk response to
this case; to view the measures taken by the
court as very necessary in a situation where there
is a need to improve the notoriously low rates of
prosecutions in rape cases. However, when
examined more closely, the court’s approach
gives rise to some concern mainly because it
came close to undermining the rules of evidence
in order to allow for greater religious and
cultural accommodation. The court’s response
was not about the valid need for witness
protection or even about making the court
process less intimidating for female rape victims,
but about the need to ‘respect’ the religious
identity of Muslim women as endorsed by the
Muslim theological expert used by the court. In
many other situations, the same religious
framework used to determine state response to
minority women can and will work against the
interests of women precisely because it is not
they but religious ‘experts’ who validate their
responses. In a political climate where there is
huge pressure on women to conform to standards
laid down by fundamentalists and religionists,22 it
is women who have the most to lose when the
rule of law or important legal safeguards are
undermined or when needs are determined upon
the basis of religious identity.  It therefore
becomes all the more necessary to uphold the
rule of law since women’s freedom (from terror
and torture within the context of the family) is
as dependent on it as is the freedom of those who
are targeted as so-called state ‘terrorists’.
Far from empowering minority women, the
court’s approach is inhibitive because it
inevitably draws on very narrow assumptions
about religious identity. Yet, the approach taken
by the court has been widely circulated by the
police as a model on how to address religious and
cultural issues within the criminal justice system.
Ultimately, it is a disturbing case, since it is only
a short step to accepting the view that Muslim
and other ethnic minority women have no need
to utilise the secular legal system, since they are
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governed by their own community or personal
laws. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in
Germany when a Moroccan Muslim woman was
denied a divorce in the face of domestic violence
by a judge who stated that as a Muslim woman,
she was governed by the Koran and not the civil
law of the land (Hari 2007). The decision was
eventually overruled but the danger of adopting
a culturally relativist approach is all too obvious.
7 The role of religion in shaping public policy
The speed with which the English legal system
and indeed all public institutions are absorbing
minority religious identity at the exclusion of all
else, is alarming. One glaring example of this is
the way in which the government has set up
numerous advisory forums to discuss issues
affecting minority communities but involving
religious leaders or increasingly Muslim women
as opposed to black and minority ethnic (BME)
women only. For instance in 2002, the
government set up the Muslim Women’s
Network UK (2006), which conducted a series of
closed focus group discussions in 2006 to give
voice to Muslim women’s needs.
The report launched soon after by the Muslim
Women’s Network UK23 identified many issues
such as gender-based violence, immigration
difficulties, community pressures, racism and the
lack of political representation – most of which
are not specific to Muslim women only. But by
attributing such experiences to Muslim women,
the state wittingly or unwittingly homogenises
Muslim religious identity and isolates the
experiences of Muslim women from those of
other South Asian women with whom they share
specific family values and norms, due to their
common social, cultural and political histories of
origin in the Indian sub-continent. For example
issues of ‘honour’ and ‘shame’, which are central
organising features of all South Asian families
and beyond critical in controlling female
sexuality, are increasingly being attributed to
Muslim women only.
The strategy of isolating Muslim women’s needs
and presenting them as somehow ‘different’ from
those of other South Asian women in particular
is deliberate and divisive. It plays into the
fundamentalist segregationist agenda and denies
the overwhelming success of secular Asian
women’s projects organising against gender-
based violence and discrimination across
ethnicities, cultures and religion. The approach
strongly undermines the solidarity that has been
forged by minority women and encourages
groups to compete for resources and separate
provision based solely around religious identity.
Collaborations between state institutions and
faith groups on issues that were once the terrain
of black and minority feminists are now evident
up and down the country. In July 2005, the
Greater London Domestic Violence Project, for
instance, organised a round table discussion on
domestic violence with faith leaders from
London’s main religions, many of whom
belonged to minority religions. But no secular
feminist groups that had worked on domestic
violence within minority communities were
invited to be part of the same discussion. The
effect of this is two-fold: first, it empowers
community leaders to take responsibility for
issues such as domestic violence without having
to account to women in their communities; since
they are encouraged to relate only with the state
through engagement in inter-faith partnerships.
Second, the absence of feminists and progressive
groups from such discussions serves to
de-legitimise feminist and secular approaches to
social issues within minority communities.
This event led to the publication of a report
entitled ‘Praying for Peace’. While it does
contain feminist analysis of domestic violence, it
also encourages partnerships between faith
leaders and the ‘domestic violence sector’ (white
but not black and minority secular feminists) in
addressing issues of domestic violence.
Unsurprisingly, the entire debate on violence
against women is circumscribed within a
religious framework which by its very nature
compromises progressive human rights language
and principles. For example, the report utilises
religious notions of ‘karma’ and ‘sin’, which
clearly act as substitutes for the feminist notions
of human rights, choice and autonomy. Perhaps
the most significant aspect of the report is the
emergence of a contract between state and
religious leaders to tackle issues such as
domestic violence, forced marriage and other
forms of abuse within minority communities. But
the trade-off is not about protecting minority
women, but about the maintenance of public
order in return for communal (family) autonomy.
By appearing to take responsibility for issues like
domestic violence or forced marriage in minority
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communities, religious leaders can expect
increased state support and resources, which
ultimately give them greater control over women
(Greater London Authority 2006).
The reality of women’s lives does not support the
view that most minority women choose identity
according to their faiths alone. In a study
carried24 out by SBS on the impact of the
cohesion and faith-based agenda on women, the
majority of women of various ages and religious
backgrounds who were interviewed, expressed
very strong negative sentiments of mistrust and
alienation from religious-based leaderships
within religious institutions. Of the 21 women
interviewed, all except one professed to some
form of religious belief and some held very
strong personal religious convictions. But all of
the respondents viewed religion as a matter of
personal choice or belief, rather than the basis of
a social identity. They did not express any sense
of belonging to a faith-based community. In fact,
their reality showed that they adopted fluid
identities which often straddled different
traditions and cultures, for example:
Tomorrow I go to celebrate Valentine’s Day. Islam says
we shouldn’t dance. I used to get awards for dancing.
I love celebrating Valentine’s Day. I will wear red
clothes and red lipstick and get a red rose … I wear
lots of makeup and perfume. I also love celebrating
Christmas and Easter. These are small pieces of
happiness.
The vast majority of the women interviewed
were adamant that they did not want religious
authority to arbitrate on family matters. Reasons
for this included memories of religious divisions
in their countries of origin (the pain of partition
of the Indian sub-continent was still raw for
some); fear of breaches of confidentiality; fear of
sexual exploitation25 and abuse of religious
power; vulnerability to coercion and social
compulsion to stay in the family; fear of not
being listened to and fear of corruption,
factionalism and struggles for power within
religious institutions. In other words, they did
not see religious institutions as simply religious
institutions but as political entities involved in
struggles for power and control over resources
and people, especially women.
8 Conclusion
We have found that, despite challenges and
protests from secular feminists, and subject to a
few exceptions which serve only to prove the rule,
there is no political will within or without the
state to confront the problem of the erosion of
the secular fabric of public culture in the UK.
Liberals and anti-racists alike have uncritically
embraced the view that the adoption of a political
religious identity is inevitable and necessary in
the struggle against imperialism and racism as
signified by the ‘war on terror’. While many have
been critical of the state’s cohesion agenda and
the backlash against multiculturalism, few (if
any) publicly acknowledge the close link between
the promotion of the ‘cohesion’ agenda and the
‘faith-based’ approach to the management of race
relations. Yet it is precisely this linkage which
corrals minorities into specific reactionary
religious identities and reinforces the tendency to
value religious and cultural orthodoxy and
conservatism, often imposed by powerful, illiberal
and even fundamentalist religious forces within
minority communities.
It is black and minority women who lose out in
the ensuing silence, since their bodies are being
used by the state to wage its ‘war on terror’ and
by fundamentalists and religionists to safeguard
the socioreligious identity of their communities.
The reality of women’s lives show that the
struggle for secularism is the struggle for
equality and human rights. The two struggles
are now so inextricably linked that it is
impossible to wage one without simultaneously
waging the other. This is the true significance of
SBS’s successful challenge to Ealing Council: it
highlighted the urgent need to develop a politics
of solidarity within and between communities
which recognises that what is at stake is no less
than the fight for secular, progressive, feminist
and anti-racist values – a fight which is embodied
in our name.
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Notes
* This article is an abridged, revised version of a
longer paper written for ‘Women Living
Under Muslim Law’.
1 I distinguish religious fundamentalism (the
political use of religion) from religious
observance, by following the definition
developed by Women Against
Fundamentalism: ‘Religious fundamentalism
refers to the rise of any modern religious
political movements that exercise selectivity
in the interpretation of its religious texts. Two
features that are common to all
fundamentalist religious movements stand
out: first, they claim their version of religion
to be the only true one and feel threatened by
pluralist systems of thought; and second, they
use political means by which to impose their
version of the truth on all members of their
religion. Fundamentalism is a term that can
apply to all religions but at the heart of all
fundamentalist movements is support for the
patriarchal family as a central agent of
control. And women are viewed as embodying
the morals and traditional values of the family
and whole community. These movements
demand absolute conformity to religious laws
as interpreted by male religious leaders and
deny the countless religious interpretations,
traditions and practices that have evolved
within a religion’ (Sahgal and Davies 1992).
2 See Gita Sahgal (Sahgal and Davies 1992).
3 For a history and account of the work of
Southall Black Sisters, see Southall Black
Sisters (1990) and Gupta (2003).
4 R (on the application of Kaur and Shah v
London Borough of Ealing. [2008] EWHC 2062
(Admin).
5 The accepted definition of ‘community
cohesion’ agreed by the Improvement and
Development Agency (IDeA), the LGA (Local
Government Association) and the Home
Office was first published in the LGA’s
Guidance on Community Cohesion (2002).
6 See Ealing’s Shared Future: Integration and
Community Cohesion Strategy 2007–2011. The
following objectives dominate Ealing’s
cohesion strategy, although they are by no
means exhaustive: work with faith-based
groups; publish a faith directory; hold inter-
faith conferences and improve inter-faith
working; deliver Ealing Muslim Community
engagement project by working with Muslim
children and young people on issues, problems
and social tensions affecting Muslims and how
to engage Muslim communities to engage in
the formation of public policy; deliver a faith
volunteering project for schools, hospitals and
the police targeting Muslim volunteers;
provide conflict mentoring training for young
Muslim children and people; hold a
conference that will emphasise a scholarly
interpretation of Islam that supports
integration and citizenship; launch a Muslim
network; build the capacity of third sector
organisations that will explore the values of
Islam; develop questionnaires to gather the
views of Muslims.
7 See The Islamic Right – Key Tendencies (Awaaz
2006), which traces the roots of the Muslim
Council of Britain to the long-standing Islamic
Right political party – the Jamaati-I-islami (JI)
from the Indian sub-continent,
www.awaazsaw.org/awaaz_pia4.pdf. Awaaz is a
UK-based secular network of organisations
and individuals set up to monitor religious
hatred in South Asia and the UK. Awaaz has
also researched the links between so-called
‘moderate’ Hindu organisations, such as the
Hindu Forum of Britain and the Hindu
Council UK and Hindu Right organisations in
India responsible for fomenting hatred and
violence against Muslims. It also notes that in
April 2006, Ramesh Kallidai, the General
Secretary of the Hindu Forum was appointed
commissioner by the Commission on
Integration and Cohesion. Awaaz has exposed
him as a sympathiser if not promoter of Hindu
fascism. In April 2006 for instance, he
attended a meeting of the Hindu
Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS), a British branch
of the RSS – a fascist organisation in India that
promotes Hindu supremacist ideology – where
he paid homage to a previous leader of the
RSS who extolled the virtues of Nazi Germany.
The RSS has been widely blamed for large
scale anti-minority violence in India and one of
its former members was responsible for the
murder of Mahatma Gandhi.
8 The term ‘moderates’ is peculiar to
discussions following the 9/11 bombings in
New York and is often used by the US and
European states to distinguish between
‘extreme’ and so-called ‘moderate’ Muslims.
Those Muslims who claim to advocate
moderation in respect of religious or political
beliefs and to uphold the rule of law (usually
with reference to public order) are deemed to
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be ‘Moderates’. It is however, a contested term
which is firmly located within the politics of
the ‘war on terror’.
9 For example, in 2007, in the UK, the Roman
Catholic Church threatened to close all its
adoption and fostering agencies because of
new equality legislation, which made it
unlawful for agencies to discriminate against
gay couples wanting to adopt or foster
children. The Church was seeking an
exemption from the equality legislation
pertaining to sexual orientation. We fear that
religious institutions in all religions will seek
to legitimise sexual or gender discrimination
by claiming religious privilege and by doing
so, exclude from their services those who do
not share their religious values.
10 By this, I mean forms of protest that seek to use
fear and intimidation to impose a particular
interpretation of religion on the population.
11 Over the years, there have been a number of
protests within minority populations that
reflect growing intolerance of dissent from
within. The Muslim fundamentalist protests
against Rushdie in 1989, is only one of a
growing number of protests. In 2006, Hindu
fundamentalists attempted to use the
language of human rights to stop an
exhibition of paintings in London by the
renowned Indian painter M.F. Hussain. They
argued that the naked depiction of female
deities offended ‘Hindu’ religious sensibilities
– although their claim to represent all Hindus
was never challenged by the organisers of the
exhibition. Of course, dissent is not confined
to minorities – in December 2004, Christian
fundamentalists, led by the organisation
Christian Voice, demonstrated outside the
offices of the BBC against the broadcast of
Jerry Springer, the Opera, on the grounds that it
was blasphemous.
12 In this context, the term ‘orthodox’ refers to
adherence to conventional or traditional
religious doctrine, whereas ‘fundamentalism’
refers to modern political movements that use
modern means of communication to impose a
strict and selective interpretation of a
religious text on the basis that it is the only
‘true’ interpretation.
13 See Saghal and Davies (1992).
14 See for example, ‘Civil and Religious Law in
England: A Religious Perspective’, a lecture
delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury at
the Royal Courts of Justice on 7 February 2008.
15 See Abul Taher ‘Revealed: UK’s first official
Sharia courts’, Times Online, September 2008.
See also Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, at
www.matribunal.com
16 The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal announces
itself on its website in the following way: ‘The
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) was
established in 2007 to provide a viable
alternative for the Muslim community seeking
to resolve disputes in accordance with Islamic
Sacred Law and without having to resort to
costly and time consuming litigation’. See
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, at
www.matribunal.com
17 Women Against Fundamentalism was formed
in 1989 to challenge the rise of
fundamentalism in all religions. Its members
include women from a wide range of
backgrounds and from across the world. See
www.womenagainstfundamentalism.org.uk
18 See, for example Hirani v Hirani [1983] 4 F.L.R.
232. P v R [2003] 1 F.L.R. 661 and Re M Minors
(repatriated orphans) [2003] EWHC 852. In these
cases, the English courts have for example
recognised forced or imposed marriages in
circumstances of duress and/or where undue
pressure has been applied but not those where
a petitioner has simply consented to a
marriage out of a sense of ‘duty’.
19 For more information, see www.matribunal.com
20 This is a common argument made by some
Muslim scholars, including feminist scholars
in the UK (Malik 2008). While appearing to
provide ways of negotiating competing
interests in equality and human rights in the
British context, the paper is devoid of any
sociopolitical analysis that gives rise to
demands for separate religious arbitration
systems and fails to refer to the contestations
that are taking place between feminists and
fundamentalists in the legal arena. For
example, in her analysis of the Shabina Begum
v Denbigh High School case, there is a complete
absence of any examination of the social and
political pressure exerted by Shabina’s
brother and a Muslim fundamentalist group
that advocated on her behalf and there is also
no consideration given to the impact of
growing fundamentalist demands for
recognition of religious dress codes on other
Muslim girls in the school who feared that
they too would be pressurised into wearing the
jilbab. Her paper also quotes with approval,
the attempts by Marion Boyd, the former
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Attorney General of Ontario, Canada, to
legitimise and regulate Muslim arbitration
systems within Ontario’s civil legal system.
However, it fails to mention that this
development was contested by Canadian
Muslim women, who in coalition with other
women, eventually won a vital victory against
the attempts to severely limit women’s
universal access to equality and human rights.
See, for example Canadian Council of Muslim
Women (2007).
21 The details of this case were circulated to the
SBS among other organisations, on 20
October 2006 by fax, by a police Inspector
from the Specialist Crime Directorate of the
Metropolitan Police Force.
22 The term refers to those who strictly adhere
to religious tenets and values only.
23 The Muslim Women’s Network UK is an
independent network of Muslim women who
seek to provide a ‘channel’ between Muslim
women and the British State to ensure that
they have equality of opportunity and an
effective voice. See
www.mwnuk.co.uk/content.php?id=84
24 Following SBS’s victory in challenging Ealing
Council under the Equality legislation, a pilot
study was carried out by SBS with funding
from Oxfam UK. The goal of the study was to
assess the impact and process of the cohesion
agenda and to bring the severely marginalised
voices of women from ethnic minority groups
within the UK into the debate on community
cohesion. A report on the findings will be
published by SBS in winter 2010.
25 In the study, a significant number of women
recounted cases where religious authorities
had abused their positions of power. A
particularly common fear that emerged was
the fear of being sexually abused by figures of
religious authority.
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